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POPULAR RESISTANCE IN NAMIBIA, 1920-1925
Tony Emmett
The first five years of the South Africa mandate marked an import-
ant milestone in the development of resistance in Namibia. Between
1920 and 1925 resistance against colonial rule assumed a variety of
forms unparallelled in Namibian history. The Bondelswarts rebelled in
1922 and the Rehoboth Basters, with their Herero, Damara and Nama
allies, in 1925. Further smaller-scale outbursts of violence erupted
in other parts of the territory, and rumours of a general black rising
were rife amongst both black and white communities. Even the San, who
were usually isolated from other black communities by their nomadic
existence in marginal parts of the territory, resorted to stock theft
and banditry on an unusual scale, becoming embroiled in skirmishes
with the police and administrative officials. This period also saw
the introduction of new forms of political organisation that tran-
scended pre-colonial divisions and began laying a basis for national
unity. Among the organisations that were established during this
period were the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), the
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), the African People's
Organisation (APO) and the South West Africa National Congress
(SWANC). In particular, UNIA with its pan-Africanist platform proved
remarkably successful, spreading from the industrial centre of
Luderitz to other urban centres, and then to the countryside.
The resistance movements of this phase of Namibian history have
thus far received little attention from researchers. The few studies
of resistance during this period have concentrated almost exclusively
on the two rebellilons and, for the most part, treat these outbursts
as discrete episodes unconnected with other manifestations of protest.
Very little has been written about the various political organisations
that came into being during this period, and where these are mention-
ed, it is usually in the context of urban centres such as Luderitz and
Widhoek. Some of the most striking features of this period such as
the diversity and scale of popular involvement and the rich network of
relationships connecting the different strands of protest, have there-
fore gone largely unnoticed.
However, what was especially noteworthy about this phase of resist-
ance was not only its intensity and scale, but the qualitative changes
in the prevailing forms of social consciousness and political mobili-
sation. The early 1920s saw for the first time concerted efforts to
transcend the narrow communal divisions of pre-colonial Namibia and to
forge a new popular unity by means of innovative ideologies and
organisational structures. Prior to this, attempts had been made to
limit conflict between indigenous communities and to forge alliances
against the colonial incursion, but these alliances had always been
between discrete communities and, on the whole, appear to have been
tenuous and unsuccessful. One of the tragedies of the great rebell-
ions of 1904-1907 was the failure of the Namas and Hereros to co-
ordinate their revolts. Following the resistance of the early 1920s,
the innovative organisations and ideologies that originated during
this period disappeared and were replaced by predominantly communal
and ethnic forms of mobilization. Defiance and confrontation gave way
to accommodation and, where it manifested itself, resistance took more
covert and symbolic forms. Although colonial opposition gained momen-
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turn during the mid-1940s, it was not until the late 1950s that formal
politicial organisations based on national and popular identifications
emerged.
This pattern of resistance raises some general questions about the
development of anti-colonial protest. There has been a clear trend in
African (and other Third World) studies to emphasise continuities in
the development of resistance. Whether this is linked to a unilinear
model of progressive westernisation or associated with the process of
imperialist and capitalist penetration, the tendency is to depict the
development of social movements as a succession of stages or as a pro-
gressively unfolding consciousness. The long-surviving notion of
"primary" and "secondary" resistance, for example, suggests a clearly
defined sequence of stages. Although this distinction originated from
the ethnocentric and teleological framework of modernisation theo-
ries, slightly modified versions still enjoy respectability, even
among "progressive" writers such as Basil Davidson. A related
approach is to see early millenarian movements as precursors or
progenitors of more "advanced" social movements like nationalism or
socialism. Thomas Hodgkin, for example, maintains that African
millenarian movements "represent a relative primitive phase in the
development of nationalism", while Eli Kedourie argues that "the
mainspring of nationalism in Asia and Africa is the same ^ecular
millenialism which had its rise and development in Europe ..." More
sophisticated analyses of socialist writers like Peter Worsley, Eric
Hobsbawn, Allen Isaacman and Charles van Onselen tend to depict
early social movements such as millenarianism and "social banditry" as
foreshadowing more class-conscious and politically-directed movements.
While a critique of evolutionary perspectives of social change is
clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it might tentatively be
suggested that more attention needs to be devoted to the discontinuous
features of change in Third World formations. As Sholto Cross suggests
in a paper on African social movements during World War I, the search
for continuities in the development of protest and social conscious-
nesspmay have helped to obscure qualitative and discontinuous chang-
es. In this paper special emphasis has been placed on the discon-
tinuous features of both colonial policies and resistance in Namibia.
The first part of the paper is devoted to an analysis of the social
conditions that gave rise to the resistance of the early 1920s, while
the latter part deals with the various manifestations of resistance,
focusing in particular on the Garveyist movement. The paper closes
with a brief analysis of the major reasons for the failure of the
resistance during this period.
On July 9, 1915 the last German troops defending the colony of
South West Africa surrendered to the numerically superior South Afri-
can forces at Khorab, ending thirty years of German colonial rule and
initiating a new phase in Namibian history. With a few limited excep-
tions, historians have devoted little attention to the five years of
military occupation which followed and helped to lay the foundations
for permanent South African control of the territory. At the basis of
this neglect has been a widely held assumption of an essential con-
tinuity between the German and South African administrations of the
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territory. Although this assumption has taken various forms and been
incorporated within a variety of different analytical frameworks, its
implications have been consistent: Namibia merely passed from one set
of imperialist interests to another, and it continued to evince the
typical characteristics of imperialist subjection and capitalist
exploitation; the "mode of exploitation" dii ,-not "change in the
slightest, and its form only in minor aspects"; South African rule
in Namibia "emulated" that of the Germans; the repression of the
Bondelswart rebellion of 1922 demonstrated to th.e_ colonised that
"under the new rulers nothing had changed for them"; the South Afri-
can administration "reproduced, if in slightly less draconian form,
the essentials of the German labour code". As with most misleading
propositions, there is an element of truth in the assumption of con-
tinuity. The goals and interests underlying South African rule were
indeed similar to those of the preceding regime, and South Africa was
the direct beneficiary of German policies of domination and expropria-
tion. Exploitation and a highly repressive labour system were the
hallmarks of South African rule in Namibia as they were of German
rule. These similarities, however, provide only part of a more com-
plex picture which includes some significant breaks with the past.
The change of regimes in Namibia was not simply an isolated event,
but was played out against the global shifts of power of the First
World War. Capture of the German colonies had been one of the war aims
of the allies, and the disposal of these colonies by means of the
mandate system was a product of the new alignments of power of the
post-World War period. Richard Rathbone has aruged that World War I
was a "period of immense and significant change" for Africa. More
specifically, the war accelerated the process of political and eco-
nomic change in colonial Africa, bringing the colonies into more
centralised relationships with the metropolitan powers and radically
altering the "style" of coloniailism.
Before 1914 Africa was for the most part a dream for the
greedy speculator. From 1918 it seems likely that her role
was more centrally related, as part of the empire, to the
very heart of the metropolitan economies.
A number of divergent, and sometimes incompatible, requirements and
influences helped shape South African policies in the territory during
the military occupation. Notwithstanding South Africa's long-standing
interests in the German colony, its legal hold over the territory was
tenuous. The invasion of German South West Africa had been undertaken
on an official understanding with Britain that all occupied territory
would be put at it's disposal for an indeterminate settlement at the
end of the war. After the successful conclusion of the military
campaign, South Africa thus set about establishing its claim to the
territory. This was based on two major arguments, that South West
Africa was essential for South Africa's national security and,
secondly, that the Germans had proved themselves unfit to rule the
colony. In order to lay the foundations for its second claim, the
South African administration in Namibia began collecting evidence of
the injustices and atrocities of German rule of the colony. The evi-
dence was published in an Imperial "Blue Book" in 1918. However, this
strategy imposed certain conditions on South Africa's administration of
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the territory. Clearly it was not only necessary to persuade the world
of the inadequacies of German colonial policy, but also to establish
that South African rule represented an appropriate improvement on
German rule. Certain minimal reforms were thus necessary in order to
secure control over the territory.
Besides these requirements there is evidence that South African
officials actively disapproved of German colonial practices. While the
two regimes shared common interests in exploiting the colony, the South
Africans were critical of the costs and efficiency of German policies.
As administrator Gorges pointed out to Smuts, it was regrettable that
"so many white lives had been lost and so many millions of pounds
wasted" on colonial wars which were a result of inappropriate colonial
policies. These wars had not only succeeded in destroying large parts
of the colonial labour supply, but posed a direct threat to South
African interests as "unrest" might spread across the borders into
South Africa. The Germans had themselves come to realise the counter-
productivity of their policies, and shortly before World War I had be-
gun to introduce reforms in a bid to stabilise the labour force.
The changeover also altered the relationship between administration
and settlers. The South African administrators found themselves in the
unusual situation of being faced not only with a hostile, or potential-
ly hostile, black population, but also a hostile white population. In
the other German colonies, most of the German settlers were expelled or
repatriated. Namibia was unique among the mandated territories in re-
taining a large German community. The possibility of a black rebell-
ion therefore posed a double threat to the military administration,
because the German community might take advantage of the opportunity to
rebel against the occupying forces and reintroduce German rule. In
part therefore, military insecurity favoured a more conciliatory
approach to the black population. Far more important, however, was the
lack of identification between administration and settlers. Especially
during the closing phase of German rule, the settlers had wielded
considerable political influence. With the change in colonial regimes,
however, the settlers were reduced to the status of enemy subjects, and
this allowed the new administration greater freedom to pursue alterna-
tive goals and interests. It was not until after the granting of the
mandate that the settlers, and in particular the farmer, were able once
again to impose their influence on colonial policy.
In spite of a perceived need for change, a number of constraints
operated to produce a degree of continuity with the past. For example,
the Hague Convention required the occupying power of a conquered terri-
tory to limit changes to existing legal and governmental structures.
South Africa's tenuous hold over the territory was also a factor limit-
ing change. Not only was the future of the territory undecided, but
the new administration experienced a variety of difficulties in the
implementation of its policies. These difficulties were associated
with the newness and temporary nature of the administration during the
period of martial law, and included staff shortages, lack of experience
and information on local conditions and the incompetence of local
officials and police. Under these circumstances, policy options were
severely limited.
A prominent feature of German colonial rule was that it telescoped
the colonial process into a relatively contracted period, achieving the
expropriation of Police Zone blacks and the creation of a rigidly con-
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trolled labour force within little more than 20 years. The brutal
suppression of the 1904-1907 rebellions and the dramatic finality of
the expropriation of most Namibians in the southern and central parts
of the country, were reflected in the laws promulgated in the post-
rebellion period. Legislation introduced immediately after the rebell-
ions aimed not only at the destruction of indigenous economic power
(and thus the creation of a servile labour force) , but also at the
destruction of indigenous social and political organisation. With a
few minor exceptions such as the Berseba Namas, the Bondelswarts and
the Rehoboth Basters, blacks in the Police Zone were prohibited from
owning or obtaining land and large stock. The law also forbade more
than ten families or individuals from residing on any farm or property.
The pass laws compelled all blacks above age of seven to register as
labourers and to wear brass badges in addition to carrying a diensbuch
(service book) with them. Blacks without labour contracts had no legal
rights, and all whites had the power to arrest them. The police were
empowered to administer direct punishment (without the control of a
court) to black servants for a variety of offences including "lazi-
ness", "negligence", "vagrancy", "insolence" and "disobedience". As
the simplest and least expensive form of punishment, flogging was used
extensively during the German period. Between January 1, 1913 and
March 31, 1914, for example, there were 2,787 "sentences" to lashes and
46,719 individual lashes administered. In terms of the semi-legal
vaterliche zuchtigungsrecht ("right of parental chastisement"), employ-
ers were allowed to mete out beatings to their labourers. Questions
were only raised in those cases where labourers were hospitalised or
died from their beatings, and even then the situation was rationalised.
As the German governor Leutwein saw it, "beating to death was not
regarded as murder^ but the natives were unable to understand such
legal subtleties."
Taken individually, the changes introduced by the South African
administration during the period of martial law appear both superficial
and insignificant. The German system of registration, together with
the diensbuch (service book) and brass badge, were abolished and re-
placed by a pass law. The age of those required to carry passes was
raised from seven to fourteen, and "Certificates of Exemption from
Labour" provided for those who could show "visible means of support".
To qualify for this certificate the applicant had to own at least ten
head of large or fifty head of small stock. As under the German law,
blacks were barred from obtaining any right or title to fixed property
without the consent of the administrator. They were, however, allowed
to acquire and own livestock. This, the Deputy-Secretary, of Native
Affairs in Windhoek reasoned, would "tend to make the native more
contented and law abiding". The South African administration clearly
did not envisage that the right to own cattle would be allowed to
interfere with the flow of labour, rather it saw the right as an
inducement to accept labour.
Although, ultimately, the South African authorities subscribed to
the same objective of labour control, they insisted that this control
should be more centralised and that there should be a stricter separa-
tion of magisterial and police functions. In other words, labour con-
trol was seen as the prerogative of the state, not of the individual
employer backed up by the state. There was thus, during the period of
martial law, a growing tendency for the central authority to define and
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regulate relations between blacks and whites, employers and employees.
Between 1916 and 1920 the Masters and Servants law was revised twice,
in order to make the regulation of labour relations more comprehensive
and detailed. Besides carefully defining the respective obligations of
employers and employees, the Masters and Servants laws outlawed the
practice of "fatherly correction" (whereby white employers had the
right to beat their servants) and put a stop to the practice of flogg-
ing which magistrates were urged to "make special efforts" to prevent.
It should be widely made known to the native that masters
and policemen have no power to flog, and any complaints of
flogging must be carefully investigated and that the
offender prosecuted without respect of person.
Spurred on by the need to discredit the former German regime and to
contrast German rule with its own, the South African administration
actively enforced the new provisions of the law. Between September
1915 and January 1918 more than 310 cases involving ill-treatment of
black servants were brought before the lower courts alone. The more
serious cases of murder and assault against white settlers were given
prominent attention in the 1918 Blue Book and elsewhere.
The real significance of these changes, however, lay not so much in
their direct contribution to reform, but in the effects produced by
their combination with surviving elements of German policy. As al-
ready argued, South African policy in Namibia during the military occ-
upation was shaped by a variety of contradictory influences and con-
straints, so that what finally emerged was a combination of both
German and South African colonial policies. While these policies
shared the common goal of exploiting the labour resources of the
colony, they were not necessarily compatible as they differed in the
means they employed to secure this common goal. Furthermore, the
situation was complicated by two additional factors- The need to
discredit German rule and project an image which would be acceptable
to the international community was a factor which was extraneous to
the normal concerns of a labour-extractive system. It helped to
produce, in the upper echelons of the administration, a tentative
liberalism which was out of step with the rest of the social formation
and which quickly evaporated after the granting of the Mandate. A
second set of complications resulted from the logistic difficulties
associated with creating a new administration under the conditions of
war.
While it retained the general framework of the German forced labour
system, the South African administration removed some of the means by
which labour had been extracted. German labour policy was dependent
on a generalised and decentralised system of violence for its survi-
val. When the South Africans administration prohibited the practices
of flogging and "parental chastisement" strains occurred within the
system of control. Instead of being able to "discipline" their
labourers themselves, farmers were now obliged to travel to the seat
of the district magistracy. This often involved the inconveniences of
long journeys and of being absent from their farms for a number of
days. Besides the loss of time and other expenses entailed, the
farmers feared that absence from their farms would result in other
labourers deserting, stealing their stock, or neglecting to take prop-
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er care of their farms. In addition, there was the uncertainty of
whether the farmer would be able to secure a conviction against his
servant as some of the magistrates were regarded as too "lenient".
However, in those cases where a conviction was secured and the labour-
er was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the farmer would be
deprived of his labour for that period. According to colonial offi-
cials, black labourers were aware of of their employers' dependence on
them and took some satisfaction in serving jail sentences because this
deprived their employers of their labour.
A second policy conflict arose out of the relaxation of the German
restrictions on the ownership of stock. While the ban on the owner-
ship of large stock was repealed and provision made for the exemption
of certain black stock-owners from the labour requirement, no clear
policy emerged for the allocation of land to the colonised. The
German law which prohibited blacks from obtaining "any right or title
to fixed property" remained in force, and the question of reserves was
held in abeyance until after the granting of the Mandate. This incon-
sistency in the policy of the military administration held a number of
important implications. As the number of black owned stock increased,
so obviously did the need for land. In order to meet the land shortage
black stock owners adopted a variety of strategies. In some cases
they simply moved onto vacant Crown land or unoccupied farms. Some of
these squatter settlements were later recognised as temporary reserves
by the administration. Squatting on white farms also became common
during this period, particularly as it provided a source of labour at
a time of severe labour shortage. In other cases government,
municipal or private land was hired for grazing. Temporary reserves
like Orumba and Okatumba in the Windhoek magisterial district soon
became overstocked and overcrowded. As a result conflicts arose with
the white farmers who complained of stock thefts and trespassing on
their land. When more permanent reserves were finally established
in the early 1920s, the administration decided to close the temporary
reserves and met with strong resistance from their occupants. The
accumulation of stock by blacks who had been formerly prohibited from
doing so, also threatened the interests of settler farmers. Settlers
complained that their farms were being overrun by the stock of their
labourers. They claimed that if they tried to limit the number of
stock kept by their servants, they ran the risk of losing ttem - a
serious eventuality in a situation of chronic labour shortage.
The incompatible influences at work in the transitional colonial
policies of the military period led also to conflicts between the
plice and senior administrative officials. The police who had been
recruited from South Africa and identified closely with the settler
farmers, did not understand or share the views of senior officials who
wish to present an enlightened image of the South African administra-
tion of Namibia. The magistrate of Outjo complained to the Secre-
tary for the Protectorate in 1920 that distrust between police admini-
strative personnel had resulted in "a want of that harmony between
magistrate and police which is so essential to the good administration
of any District, while it also encourages the native to think that the
plice are in the wrong and are inimical to them thus leading to the
insolent attitude complained o£ - an attitude in marked contrast to
what it was under German rule".
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The problems experienced with the police were but one symptom of a
more general malaise that permeated the administration. The magistrate
of Okahandja succinctly summed up the situation in 1920:
When one looks back at the past four and a half years with
what we have had to contend - dealing with an hostile
ppulation, wholly insufficient and inefficient staffs,
incompetent and almost useless police, a complete change of
native policy, the disorder on active warfare, and, above
all, an Administration which was necessarily unstable and to
a certain extent temporary and uncertain - it is not to be
wondered at that conditions today are still far from ideal
or even satisfactory. The instructions laid down in the
native memorandum (of 1916) ... were a big step forward in
the right direction. Unfortunately - and here I think one
touches on the crux of the whole matter - it has not been
found possible in the absence of constant and firm supervi-
sion, with the staff and police at our disposal, to carry
out the excellent directions laid down.
This administrative malaise served not only to create friction
within the ranks of the administration, but also impaired the control
the colonial state was able to exercise over the colonised, preventing
it from effectively executing those functions of dominance and control
central to the colonial enterprise. Within this context the black
work force was able to devise various strategies to resist or by-pass
the system of forced labour. Although desertion had become a well-
established tactic even under German rule, shortages and inefficiency
of police, the removal of police powers from the settlers, and the
general inefficiency and lack of control of the administration made
desertion and the withholding of labour an even more attractive and
feasible prospect during the period of martial law. The disruptions
and confusion caused by the military campaign and change of admini-
strations provided further opportunities for desertion and other forms
of resistance. Following the Union's invasion and occupation of the
territory, desertions, particularly from farms, reached unprecedented
heights, precipitating a severe labour crisis, especially among
farmers. Another way of circumventing the repressive labour system
was by accumulating enough stock to qualify for an exemption certif-
icate. The magistrate of Otjiwarongo reported in 1920 that "the
Herero" was "straining every nerve to acquire large and small stock,
in order that he may again become independent and relieved of the
necessity of working". He maintained that between 1914 and 1920 black-
owned small stock had increased from "no more than a few hundred" to
more than 4,000 in his district. In the minds of both the settler
and the authorities, the dramatic increase in black-owned stock was
closely linked to increasing stock thefts during this period. Although
the available evidence makes it difficult to confirm or refute this
link, it would appear that losses of small stock in particular were
very heavy. It was even alleged that because of stock theft small
stock farming was no longer viable in the territory.
However, for the majority of blacks in Namibia the strategies
outlined above were not immediately available. At the low wages paid
during this period, it would have been impossible for most blacks to
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obtain sufficient stock to qualify for exemption from forced . labour.
Strategies such as stock theft, desertion and living in the veld held
their own limitations and difficulties. Even for those who were able
to acquire exemption certificates, problems still arose as to where
they could keep their stock as there was little land available to
black stock-owners during this period. In the situation the majority
of Blacks fell back on the widespread strategy adopted in other parts
of Africa against forced labour, poor wages and other conditions of
colonial repression. In the words of the settlers and colonial
authorities, they became "insolent", "lazy", "inefficient", "unreli-
able" and "negligent". By 1920 complaints of this sort had reached a
climax and permeated every level of the settler community. The
administration showed some awareness of the relationship between the
inefficiency of the black labour and the repressive labour policy of
the state. The magistrate of Otjiwarongo, for example, referred to "a
passive resistance movement, at present confined to doing the work as
badly as possible" and the Secretary for the Protectorate pointed
out that "large numbers" of blacks
work only because the law compels them to do so, and in
consequence they do their work with very little grace and
with only so much effort as circumstances demand. This is
the reason for the general complaint about the inefficiency
of labour in this country ...
Another unanticipated consequence of the change in colonial admini-
stration during the World War I was the generation of unrealistic, but
firmly held, expectations of reform among the black population. The
defeat of the German colonial power during the war helped foster the
belief that their lands would be returned to them. As late as 1946, a
Herero witness told Michael Scott:
What we don't understand is that when two nations have been
at war, such as Britain or Germany or Italy, and when one or
other of those nations is defeated the lands belonging to
that nation are not taken away from them. That nation
remains a nation, and their lands belong to them. The Afri-
can people although they have always been on the side of
British people and their allies, yet have their lands taken
away from
 4£hem and are treated as though they had been
conquered.
Expectations like these appear to have been widespread among Police
Zone blacks during the military period. It is probable that these
beliefs were encouraged by reforms adopted during this period. Al-
though these were only minor concessions, war propaganda, the prosecu-
tion of German employers, and the tensions that existed between sett-
lers, police, and administrators undoubtedly made an impact on Namib-
ians. These expectations were, however, to be rudely shattered in the
period that immediately followed the military administration, and
played a significant role in the concerted resistance to colonial rule
between 1920 and 1925.
It was against this background that South Africa was granted the
mandate over Namibia. The new security of tenure that came with the
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mandate meant that the colonial administration needed no longer to
pander to international opinion by presenting a liberal image to the
world. Colonial policies could now follow colonial interests, and the
paternalism of the interim military administration could be stripped
away to reveal the grim realities and requirements of the settler
economy. With the end of the war and the international recognition of
South Africa's right to Namibia, the German settlers could be welcomed
back into the fold as fellow whites and colonial masters. There was
no longer a need, as there had been in the earlier period, to depict
them as brutal and vicious in their treatment of blacks.
Changes in colonial policy in Namibia after 1920 were not only a
response to the new international status of the territory, but also
reflected the deepening political crisis in South Africa where the
government was coming under increasing pressure from Afrikaner
nationalists and militant labour. From the beginning Botha and
Smuts regarded Namibia as a potential safety-valve for the political
pressures building up in South Africa. Even before the German forces
in Namibia had surrendered, Botha wrote to Smuts about the possibility
of using the lures of land and jobs to neutralise dissatisfaction,
particularly amongst the Afrikaners.
We shall have to make a point of it in the elections that
the territory will now afford an opening particularly for
acquiring land, as well as an opening in the police and
administration.
Following the South African occupation of the territory, the
military administration devoted considerable attention to restoring
farming, commerce and industry in the territory. Mining was resumed
although on a smaller scale than previously and farming flourished
owing to the ready markets for farm produce during and immediately
after the war. Not only did the presence of the Union garrison
provide a market within the territory, but there were also excellent
markets for slaughter stock both in South Africa and overseas. The
abnormal prices realised for stock resulted in high values being
placed on land. Partly because of the high values of land and the
uncertain future of the territory, few settlers entered the country
during this period. The smallness of the settler population in turn
ensured that the level of agricultural production would remain low,
thus maintaining the high prices.
However, within two years of the war the economic boom came to an
end, and by 1922 the territory, along with other parts of the world,
had entered the depths of the post-war recession. The disbandment of
the military garrison after the war meant that an important local
market for farm produce was lost. The end of the war had also seen
the reorganisation of agriculture on a world scale and the consequent
contraction of markets for slaughter stock and other produce both in
South Africa and overseas. At the same time a severe drought overtook
the territory. The situation deteriorated further with the reversal
of the inflow of capital from Germany to the territory, and the severe
slump in diamonds and other major mineral products of Namibia.
With the establishment of the mandate, a more sympathetic policy
was adopted to the settler community early in 1921 an Advisory Council
was appointed to represent settler interests, and played a prominent
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role in shaping colonial policies of this period. An extensive
settlement scheme, based on the grossly x>ver-optimistic recommenda-
tions of the Farmers' Produce Commission, was launched in the second
half of 1920. The scheme coincided with the onset of recession and
drought, and by 1921 most of the new settlers and even some of the
more established farmers were in serious financial difficulties.
Rather than back down on its settlement policy, the administration
continued to dispose of large quantitites of land to South African
settlers, many of whom had neither the financial resources nor the
farming experience to cope with the harsh demands of the Namibian
environment. In support of this short-sighted scheme, the administra-
tion provided extensive financial aid to the white farming community,
and increased pressures on indigenous communities to provide labour to
the largely unviable farming operations. Both strategies were to
have disastrous consequences. The pressures put on indigenous communi-
ties were to provide a major impetus to the revolts of the Bondel-
swarts and the Basters, while the aid provided to settlers only suc-
ceeded in encouraging dependence on state aid and ensuring the short-
termed survival of essentially unviable farming ventures.
The vigorous settlement policy also had implications for the allo-
cation of reserves. Essentially, the reserves policy that was initiat-
ed in the early 1920s emerged out of the contradictory blend of South
African and German policies that characterised the military period.
In South Africa the major thrust of native policy had been to frame
legislation and administrative devices to draw labour out of the
reserves. German colonial policies in Namibia, on the other hand, had
attempted the proletarianization of the majority of the population in
the Police Zone by means of military force. The existence of a large
landless population, however, posed problems of control for the South
African administration in the territory. The policy that emerged dur-
ing the early 1920s was therefore an attempt to steer a course between
the two contradictory demands of establishing reserves (in order to
facilitate control, reverse, or at least control, black urbanisation,
and standardise administrative procedures) and, at the same time, en-
sure an adequate supply of labour. As the Native Affairs official
Captain Bowker pointed out in 1916, the two goals were not necessarily
incompatible:
It may prove more economical to consider the possibility of
establishing one large settlement for all the Protectorate
Natives in an area such as the Kaokoveld, where the natives
would be entirely segregated from the European Farming
community, and from which, through economic pressure, they
would be forced to seek employment, the labour market thus
not being seriously affected; on the contrary, it is felt,
that such a course would act as a stimulus to labour, for
the natives would be under closer control and the payment of
such taxes as may be levied could be
 c£ffectually enforced
and such money would have to be earned.
In addition to these considerations, provision had to be made to
accommodate the livestock accumulated by landless blacks and those in
the overcrowded "temporary reserves". It was also hoped that the
allocation of reserves would go some way towards meeting black land
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demands and the expectations generated by the change in regimes. In
broad outlines therefore the policy of the early mandate administra-
tion made provision for the creation of reserves to accommodate the
residents of the temporary reserves, squatters on both white farms and
the Rehoboth Gebiet, and the "surplus" populations of the urban areas.
The amount of land allocated was, however, strictly controlled. Furth-
ermore, land was allocated largely in marginal areas of the country
which were less suitable for farming. A variety of economic pressures
such as grazing fees, dog taxes and the strict control of "informal
sector" economic activities were imposed to facilitate the efflux of
migrant labour. These measures were incorporated into an over-arching
system of legislative and administrative controls which applied to all
blacks in the country.
In terms of the 1921 recommendations of the Native Reserves Commis-
sion, 655,650 hectares would be allocated for the proposed reserves
and a further 636,881 hectares "in case of future extension, or of
unsuitability of the proposed reserves". Together with the reserves
that had been created during the German period, the total allocation
of land for Africans, as envisaged by the Commission, amounted to
2,237,874 hectares. This was only slightly more than, the 2,125,154
that had been allocated to 311 settlers in 1921 alone. In spite of
the meagreness of the proposed areas, the opening oJL the reserves was
delayed by drought and inadequate water supplies. By the end of
1923, 634,000 hectares had been allocated. The insignificance of this
area can be gauged from a comparison with the more than 1,9 million
hectares allocated for settlers in 1922 and 1923 at the height of the.
drought. A further 349,782 hectares were added to the reserves in
1924 and about 754,360 in 1925. With the proclamation of Otjimbingwe
(77,498 hectares) after 1925, the programme of the Reserves Commission
was completed.
Grazing fees were extended to all reserves with the exception of
those granted under German treaty. Livestock was taxed on a sliding
scale with the obvious intention of limiting the number of animals
kept on the reserves. Thus large stock was taxed on the basis of 1 d.
per head per mensem for one to twenty five head, and 3 d* for herds of
twenty six or more- Similarly the grazing fee for small s±pck was /4
d. for herds of 100 or less and Vz d. for those above 100. That the
major aim of grazing fees was to ensure a steady flow of labour for
the reserves is made clear by the report of the Native Reserves Com-
mission 1928. In the reserves recognised by German treaties, graz-
ing taxes were not imposed. However, a dog tax , also ha Red on a
sliding scale, was levied under Proclamation No. 16 of 1921. Par-
ticularly in the early twenties the tax proved an effective instrument
for forcing labourers from these reserves onto the labour market and
was an important contributory cause in the Bondelswart rising of 1922.
To bolster the reserve system, a battery of laws and regulations were
passed between 1920 and 1922. These included amendments to the Mas-
ters and Servants laws, a vagrancy law, and a series of regulations
making provision for the removal of squatters from Crown and Mission
land, the control of movement of all blacks in the territory, the
branding of black-owned cattle and the control of blacks in urban
areas.
To sum up, the first five years of the mandate saw an important
shift in colonial policies, away form the limited reformism of the
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military period and towards a more rigorous system of control. In part
this shift was a result of the administration's need to rationalise
its policies, both by bringing them more in line with those in the
Union and by resolving the contradictions that had arisen from the
blending of South African and German colonial policies during the
military period. It flowed also out of the greater security of tenure
provided by the mandate, the deepening political crisis in South
Africa, and the ill-timed and short-sighted settlement policy to which
these two developments gave rise. Perhaps the most crucial factor in
the configuration of events that contributed to the resistance of the
early 1920s was the extreme vulnerability of settler agriculture in
Namibia during this period. The marginality of settler farmers made
them heavily dependent on extra-economic coercion to ensure a supply
of cheap and servile labour.
This is vividly illustrated by the conditions that gave rise to
Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922. Conflict between the Bondelswarts and
white farmers was evident from the beginning of South African rule.
In 1915, for example, the Native Affairs Department reported that al-
though the Bondelswarts were "anxious to obtain employment ... several
absolutely set their faces against accepting work with farmers. On
being asked the reason I was told in almost every instance, that farm-
ers were used to dispense Justice without reference to anyone". There
could be little doubt, the Department argued, that the "great shortage
of farm labour" was a natural reaction to the "ill- treatment meted
out to farm labourers in the past, by German and Dutch farmers alike".
In spite of this the Department was using "every effort and persua-
sion" to induce the local black population to accept farm labour. In
the same year the officer in charge of Native Affairs reported that
several incidents had been brought to his notice
where farmers engage boys at 15/- per month, and when paying
them off, they give them the equivalent in stock. The
equivalent of a goat usually being 15/- ... I need need not
point out that 15/- ... is much in excess of the value of an
ordinary breeding jgpat, which is worth from 5/- to 10/-
according to size.
Nor had the situation changed for the better in 1920 when the mili-
tary magistrate of Warmbad blamed deteriorating relationships between
whites and blacks in the area on the "poor wages, improper treatment
(and) poor food" to which farm labourers were subjected. The farmers,
he said,
look upon the Hottentots as a kind of animal, not a human
being and his first impression is that a Hottento_k because
he is a Hottentot should have a hiding once a day.
Many of the settlers attracted to the Protectorate by low interest
loans, were farmers possessing little capital or stock and contemp-
tuously known as "bokboere" (goat farmers) by the more established
settlers. The portion of these already marginal settler farmers
deteriorated further as a result of the poor rains between 1918 and
1920, and the severe drought of 1921-22. Complaints about poor wages
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and the withholding of pay were already common during the military
period, and the situation could only deteriorate under the combined
assault of the drought and recession of the early 1920s. The admini-
strator, for example, reported in 1922 that because of the depression,
"many farmers not of the really poor class, unfortunately find them-
selves unable to pay wages- in cash and some are unable to feed their
employees properly". Although the administration was opposed to the
payment of wages in kind, the administrator said he saw no immediate
"option but to countenance the payment of wages in kind where the
native does not object".
It is one of the ironies of the build up to the Bondelswart rebell-
ion that at a time when the administration was sanctioning the payment
of wages in kind, it should impose an absurdly high tax to force the
Bondelswarts into the labour market. A dog tax of 5/- was first
introduced in the rural areas in 1917, but under pressure from farm-
ers, the administration in 1921 increased the tax to £1 for the first
dog, £2/10/- for two doga. £4/10- for three dogs, £7 for four dogs,
and £10 for five dogs. Dogs played an important role in the
Bondelswarts economy. Not only were they used for hunting, but they
were essential for the protection from, and destruction of vermin,
particularly jackals. In those cases where the dog tax was not paid,
the police were empowered to seize and destroy dogs. Prosecution of
Bondelswarts for non-payment of the tax commenced in September 1921,
and by January 1922 the Warmbad Magistrate had tried 140 cases v. The
average sentence was a fine of £2 or fourteen days imprisonment. In
addition to the dog tax, the Bondelswarts were subjected to a variety
of other pressures and regulations such as the strictly enforced game
laws, which put further obstacles in the way of hunting, and quaran-
tine regulations which prevented the Bondelswarts from selling live-
stock on the most profitable markets.
Another key issue which helped to precipitate the Bondelswarts re-
bellion revolved around the appointment of a captain for the communi-
ty. A labour extraction system of the type that operated in Namibia
during the early mandate period, was not only dependent on the state
to dislodge a labour force from the countryside, but also required the
assistance of the state to counteract any political or military
organisation (or even individual defiance) on the part of the labour
force or potential labour force. In the case of the Bondelswart
community, the past rebellions and military successes of the Bondel-
swarts were a potent source of anxiety for the settlers. As the
Bondelswarts had been able to maintain a territorial base in spite of
their rebellion against the German colonial authorities, they were
able to retain a certain degree of communal identity and political
organisation. Settlers and state thus sought to limit and control the
political organisation of the BOndelswarts. These efforts largely
took the form of preventing the Bondelswarts from obtaining effective
leadership. Until 1918 the state resisted all moves to secure the
appointment of a captain. The position of the administration was
clearly stated by the magistrate of Warmbad in 1917:
I cannot in my opinion too strongly advise the Administra-
tion not to appoint a Captain or Chief over the Bondelswarts
as that would immediately combine the nation which could
then give endless trouble.
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Although the administration continued to resist the appointment of
Jacobus Christian, the most influential leader of the Bondelswarts,
between 1918 and 1922 it sanctioned the appointments of three captains
for the Bondelswarts. The first, Willem Christian, was described by
the local magistrate as a "harmless idiot who was incapable of influ-
encing his people in any way or even showing any interest in them". He
was followed by Hendrik Schneeuwe, who had to be removed after he was
accused of embezzling tribal funds. Timotheus Beukes, described by
the Chief Native Commissioner as having "no desire or particular abil-
ity" to lead the Bondelswarts, then assumed the captaincy. Ultimate-
ly, it was the return of the legitimate and effective Bondelswart
leaders, Jacobus Christian and Abraham Morris, from Namaqualand, that
precipitated the rebellion of 1922.
*»##*****#»»»»*•»*#•#
Having sketched in the context that gave rise to the resistance of
the early 1920s in the first part of this paper, this section will
examine some of specific manifestations of that resistance. As the
rebellions of 1922 and 1925 have already been adequately documented,
they will not be dealt with here, except to place them within the
broader context of resistance. Instead this section of the paper will
focus predominantly on the Universal Negro Improvement Association
(UNIA) which provided the ideological nexus around which the various
strands of resistance coalesced and began to obtain the coherence of a
movement.
The Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities
League (UNIA & ACL) was launched in Luderitz in 1921. The catalyst
for the formation of this branch of the Garveyist organisation was a
small group of West Africans and West Indians who had settled largely
in the coastal towns of the territory. The majority of this group
originated from Liberia, the Cameroons, Sierra Leone and the Gold
Coast, and had been brought into the territory by the Germans before
and during World War I. In 1910, for example, fifty men and a number
of women and children were deported from the German colony of Kamerun
to Luderitz, following a mutiny among the black Schutztruppe in the
West African colony. The majority of this group were returned to West
Africa after the occupation of Namibia by South African-forces, but a
number who were working in Luderitz stayed behind. Other West
Africans, particularly the Liberians, had been brought to Namibia by
the Woermann shipping company. Some of these had been deck hands on
the Woermann ships and had been stranded in Luderitz and other coastal
towns when war broke out in 1914.
While they intermarried with the local people, the West Africans
formed a distinctive segment of the Namibian population. As a group
they had a higher level of education and greater urban and industrial
skills than the local population and some earned relatively high
wages. Others lived on the fringes of their communities supporting
themselves by gambling or petty crime. The magistrate of Luderitz and
Swakopmund complained frequently about the "gambling and thieving
propensities" of the West Africans in their districts. The West Afri-
cans were "the cause of a lot of trouble", the magistrate of Luderitz
complained in 1920. Many of them lived "by swindling the aborigines
of their hard earned wages by card sharping". The police believed
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that they were "corrupting" the local blacks and were the cause of an
escalating crime rate in Luderitz, but perhaps most troublesome to the
administration were the "political inclinations" of some of the West
Africans.
The first formal connection between Namibia and the Garveyist
organisation occurred in 1919 when the UNIA sent commissioners to the
Versailles Peace Conference in an unsuccessful attempt-to influence
the plans being framed for the former German colonies. In 1922 a
UNIA delegation was sent to Geneva to petition the League of Nations
to turn the former German colonies over to black leadership. The
League was also urged to appoint a black representative to the perma-
nent Mandates Commission. Another petition relating to the mandates
was issued by llarvey in 1928, but enjoyed as little success as the
first attempt. Although Garvey's ambitions for the former German
colonies failed to have any impact on the international status of the
colonies, the ideas propagated by his organisation were of consid-
erable significance to political developments in Namibia. In fact
Garveyism and its various mutant versions provided the first coherent,
if somewhat fanciful, ideological framework within which the various
Namibian communities could unite in their efforts to resist
colonialism.
Towards the end of 1921 the Luderitz branch of UNIA had a member-
ship of 311 and had collected £41/10/0 an subscription fees. Given
the size of the black population of Luderitz (2,155 according to the
1921 census) and the low wages of the overwhelming majority, this was
a considerable achievement. The organisation catered for both the
welfare and the political needs of its members. Its welfare benefits
included assistance in time of sickness, funeral expenses, and finan-
cial assistance of relatives of deceased members. Its membership
covered the whole spectrum of black groups, both local and foreign, in
Luderitz.
Two members of the UNIA executive are mentioned recurrently in the
administration's files. Fritz Headley, the president, was.clearly the
dominant figure in the organisation, and John de Clue was, a^.Lrominent
member of both the UNIA and the ICU. Both men were descr,Z.td' as West
Indians. John de Clue was the owner of a cafe in the black township,
while Headley was chief stevedore at the LuderitjL docks and earned a
daily salary of seven shillings plus rations. According to a
summary of wages drawn up by Native Affairs Department of Luderitz
from labour contracts approved by the Department thfL average daily
wage for blacks ranged between one shilling and 2/6. When members
of the UNIA and ICU in Luderitz broke away from these two organisa-
tions to form the SIVA African National Congress, the reason given was
that the two organisations were dominated by West Africans and South
African blacks respectively.
The issues taken up by the Luderitz branch of UNIA were also in-
dicative of the distinctive interests of its leadership. Although the
organisation called for a unity and freedom from colonial oppression
on behalf of all blacks, these appeals were characteristically couched
in the vaguest of terms. On the other hand, where the Luderitz branch
expressed more concrete grievances, it was representing the interests
of a small and privileged minority, a distinctive and largely foreign
black petty bourgeoisie. This is clearly illustrated by a letter
written by Headley, as president of the Luderitz branch, to the Negro
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World in 1921. Headley begins his letter with a protest against the
"tyrannical system of serfdom and injustice" applied in Luderitz and
other parts of Namibia. Towards the end of the letter he criticises
the inadequate medical facilities provided for blacks in Luderitz.
However, sandwiched between this show of altruism, and taking up the
larger part of the letter, is a clearly spelt out appeal on behalf of
black traders in Luderitz. This marginal trading class established
four small businesses in the black township, but were being threatened
by white-owned stores operating on the periphery of the township. The
question of black trading rights in Luderitz was a leading issue for
both UNIA and the ICU. When black delegations representing these
organisations petitioned the magistrate of Luderitz in 1921 and the
Native Commissioner in March 1922, black trading rights were a central
grievance. This issue also came up in correspondence between the
Luderitz branch of the ICU and Kadalie. In this regard it is
perhaps significant that at least one of the owners of the four black
businesses in Luderitz, John de Clue, was a prominent member of both
the UNIA and ICU.
However, once the movement spread beyond Luderitz, its composition
and activities underwent fundamental changes. In particular, the
Windhoek branch of the organisation assumed a character markedly
different from that of the Luderitz branch, although the initiative
for its formation had come from Luderitz and it was initially run by
West Africans. By January 1922 when the Windhoek branch applied to
the local municipality for permission to erect a hall for the
organisation, the executive of the branch had already come under the
control of local black leaders. Herero leaders, in particular, were
prominent in the organisation. These included Hosea Kutako, who was
later to emerge as the dominant figure in Herero politics and one of
the most powerful Namibian leaders until the formation of the
nationalist organisations in the late 1950s, Aaron (John) Mungunda the
brother of Kutako, Traugott Maherero, the Herero leader of Okahandja
and Nikanor Hoveka, another prominent Herero leader and later headman
of the Epukiro Reserve. Although the Hereros appeared to be the
dominant force in the Windhoek branch, the leaders of other groups
were also represented on the executive. The Damara leader.^, Alpheus
Harasemab and Franz Hoisemab, were both on the executive. During
1922 the president of the Windhoek Branch was Aaron Mungunda, although
the administration suspected, with some justification, that his
brother, Hosea Kutako, was "the controlling spirit". The chairman was
Solomon Monguya, a Xhosa employed by the Railways, and the secretary
Clements Kapuuo, the father of Clements Kapuuo who was to become
leader of the powerful Herero tribal grouping after the death of
Kutako.
The UNIA spread rapidly in Windhoek and it surrounding areas.
According to the leaders of the Zwartboois, a Nama grouping which was
opposed to the organisation, "almost all the natives of Windhoek and
also of the farms of the districts" had joined the organisation by the
end of 1922. These included both "black" (Herero, Damara, etc.) and
"yellow" (Nama) people. In November 1922 the Department of Native
Affairs inspected the books of the organisation and found that 871
members had paid the required 3/3 entrance fee. The membership of the
organisation was probably much larger than indicated by the subscrip-
tion figures because the office bearers were unable to account for all
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tory, and which in 1922/3 had brought blacks and whites to the brink
of a state of war. In 1922, for example, Joseph Hailand, a UNIA
member in Usakos, had written to Headley asking what could be done to
alleviate the oppression of government and farmers, and expressing
alarm about the way in which local whites were arming themselves.
Headley replied that he did not "know of any war between white and
blacks".
We are living in a peaceful state down this way in Luderitz,
both white and blacks, alike, and I dosn't (sic) see the
cause of anybody arming themselves. One thing that I will
ask all of my people is to obey the laws of the Government,
and abide by the Constitution of the Protectorate, and I am
sure_that the Government, or the Farmers, cannot molest you
The attitude adopted by headley and other literate or semi-literate
West Indians and West Africans to the overwhelmingly illiterate indi-
genous population was often blatantly paternal. In a letter to a
local newspaper in March 1924, for example, Headley described the
objects of the UNIA in the following terms:
To establish a universal Confraternity among the race: to
promote the spirit of pride and love; to reclaim the fallen;
to administer to and assist the needy; to assist in civilis-
ing the backward Tribes of Africa; to assist in the develop-
ment of independent Negro Nations and Communities or Agen-
cies in the principal countries and Cities of the World; for
the representation and protection of all Negroes irrespec-
tive of nationality; to promote conscientious worship among
the natives of Africa; to establish Universities, Colleges,
Academies and schools for the racial Education and Culture
of the people; to conduct a world wide Commercial and Indus-
trial Intercourse for the good of the people; to work for
better conditions in all Negro Communities.
Even if one overlooks the inherent paternalism and vague, high-
flown terminology of this passage (which was clearly aimed at the
white readers of the newspaper), the aims outlined by Headley were
hopelessly remote from the pressing needs and interests of the local
population, struggling for survival in the rural areas. In the same
letter, the UNIA president went on to argue that
.. . the Negroe's that are domociled in the Protectorate
(SWA), has as much interest at stake into the Financial and
Industrial development of the Republic of Liberia, as he has
at the present time, if any, in the Windhoek Native Location
Local leaders of the Windhoek branch approached the administration
in July 1922 to obtain permission for some of their leaders to travel
to New York, where Garvey had his headquarters. The three leaders who
were to make the trip included the Windhoek president, Aaron Mungunda,
and two others, one a Nama and the other a Herero. The plan was
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squashed by the Native Commissioner who "suggested! various difficult-
ies in the way even if permission were granted".
Windhoek leaders thus concentrated their attention on propagating
the aims of their organisation in other parts of the territory. In
October and November 1922 Mungunda and Theodore Hanbanue, a Damara,
visited Karibib, Usakos and Okahandja in order to hold meetings with
the local black population. It is clear from the response they receiv-
ed that the ideas of the UNIA had already penetrated the areas beyond
Windhoek and generated considerable interest. According to the report
of a police spy at Usakos, Mungunda urged "the black men to pull to-
gether and to unite as one and then they will get their liberty as
this is their land". He explained the strength of the whites in terms
of their unity. Blacks should do the same and assist one another, no
matter if they were Hereros, Damaras or Ovambos. At Karibib Mungunda
was reported to have told a meeting that their organisation was work-
ing in conjunction with Americans and that they wanted to establish
their own administration.
The UNIA envoys seemed to have aroused the most interest in Okhand-
ja, at the time a major centre of the Hereros. Four meetings were
held there, and the report of the local police spy on these meetings
clearly illustrates the extent to which Garveyism had already become
associated with millenarian expectations. At the first meeting
Mungunda explained that the object of the organisation was to unite
blacks. He urged his audience to listen carefully to what he had to
say as he had already been wrongly reported in other districts. At
the next meeting Mungunda complained that what he had said at the
first meeting had been misunderstood, because all the young men and
women had been asking him "when the Americans were coming to release
them".
If I told you that the American Negroes were coming to
release you, I think you would be satisfied, but it would be
a lie. I know nothing about America. The society has been
formed through American ideas, but Americans only explained
it but did not do the work - we must do that. It is no use
holding out false hopes about America, because I do not
believe that they will ever be able to come here to help
you.
The police spy who attended the meeting, concluded his report by
stating that although he did not think the Okahandja blacks would
rebel, talk that the Americans were coming to free the country had
spread throughout the district.
The millenarianism that became associated with Garveyism in the
Namibian countryside, took a number of different forms, all of which
were grounded on the basic premise that help could come from the
"Americans" or some other external source. According to some versions,
the Americans would arrive in ships or aircraft, in other versions
soldiers would issue from the ground. The Rhenish missionary in Oma-
ruru reported that a rumour had spread in the district that certain
people had landed at Cape Cross and that the government should find
out whether they were not American soldiers.
Almost everywhere in the Police Zone, Garveyism created an air of
expectancy which, combined with the disillusionment of blacks and the
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underlying tensions of the society, produced a general attitude of
defiance and persistent reports of an approaching revolt. For example,
a police spy operating in the Okahandja district was told "that three
days beyond Gobabis there are a lot of natives including Hereros,
Bushmen and American negroes waiting for the white people to come
there to start a fight. There are altogether about three hundred
natives there with rifles, and some without rifles. They still want
more arms. A Herero came from there to get recruits." From what he
had heard during his tour of the district, the spy gained
the impression that the natives intend to rise and that the
action is being engineered by American negroes. The trouble
if it arises will begin on the eastern border of the dis-
trict when the rain starts. One of the causes of discontent
is the sheep inspection and the branding law. Vaccination
has also caused a great deal of discontent. The American
negroes have advised them not to brand their stock, refuse
to allow their sheep to be inspected, and refuse to be
vaccinated.
These impressions were supported by another police informer who
toured the same district a few weeks later. He reported that a number
of people had joined UNIA, had collected money for the organisation
and were waiting for badges. Yet another informer reported that at
Okasise he had been told that "the Herero people want to fight but
have no rifles".
At Okamatero I met some Hereros who said they were waiting
for the Americans, then they would start ... At Okambahe I
found a Herero who said that the American People had written
on the stone at Karibib. He said that the Americans had
built houses at Windhoek, where they can come together - . .
At V/aldau the Hereros spoke of the Americans giving a
button, to keep until the time is come ... I think the
American negroes are at the bottom of all the unrest, and
that the Hereros, except for the American influence, would
never think of fighting again, having once fought the
Germans. The Her.er.QS are very eager and anxious for the
Americans to come.
While millenarian movements have often been described as essential-
ly irrational and backward looking, as Keller points out, they also
represent "an attempt to cope with.the present, to change it, and to
create a more promising future". Michael Barkun has argued that
many millenarian movements can be seen as a response to disaster.
Men cleave to hopes of imminent worldly salvation only when
the hammerblows of disaster destroy the world they have
known and render them susceptible to ideas which they would
earlier have cast aside.
Robert Edgar has used Barkun's framework to illustrate the context
that gave rise to Wellington Butelezi' s brand of Garveyism in the
Transkei - a form of Garveyism which shared many characterisitcs
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with that of the Namibian countryside. The situation in Namibia in
the early twenties provides some confirmation of the disaster hypoth-
esis. Pre-colonial Namibian societies had been subjected to a series
of traumas and disasters, including colonial conquest, the rinderpest
epidemic of 1897, near annihilation and an unusually harsh form of
forced labour. In the early 1920s disaster had culminated in the
cruel shattering of the hopes created by the defeat of the Germans.
That the millenarian tendencies of Garveyism should have taken root
most firmly among the Hereros, also lends some credibility to the
disaster hypothesis.
However, there are aspects of millenarianism other than the re-
sponse to disaster which need to be considered. What is particularly
striking about the Namibian situation in the 1920s is not merely the
destructive (and disastrous) impact of colonialism on Namibian socie-
ties, but also the essential powerlessness of the colonised in the
face of the organisational and military capabilities of the colonial
state. It is clear that even those who had placed their faith in the
"Americans" were aware that the colonial state could only be dislodged
by military force, but it was equally apparent that indigenous com-
munities did not on their own possess the means to take on the mili-
tary power of the colonial state. For the most part Namibians did not
passively regard the "Americans" as liberators, but rather as a cata-
lyst which would help to bring about a general rising of the Namibians
themselves. Seen against this background, the millenarian beliefs
expressed by Namibian Garveyites appear less absurd or irrational. It
may be argued that the political and military assertion of the Namibr-
ian people only became a practical possibility when external develop-
ments helped to balance the disproportionate power of the colonial
state. That South African military forces had been able to dispose of
the German colonial regime raised the possibility that a third exter-
nal power - especially one perceived as being black - might be able to
sweep away the new oppressors.
Another important aspect of millenarianism in Namibia is that it
not only served as a means of boosting the morale of the colonised
(and thus providing ideological support for active defiance of the
administration and settlers), but also helped to undermine the morale
and confidence of the settler and colonial state. While settlers and
colonial officials scoffed at the absurdity of the beliefs that the
"Americans" would come to the aid of black Namibians, there was a
distinct uneasiness in their reception of these reports. There appears
to be a certain relish in the way in which black Namibians divulged to
white employers, police informers or colonial officials reports of
imminent rebellions or "American" activities. There is something of a
taunt in the example mentioned earlier that certain unknown people had
landed at Cape Gross, and that the government "should see whether
these were not Americans". The millenarian content of Namibian Garvey-
ism may thus also be seen as a specific form of political struggle, or
even as a means of extending the long tradition of military resistance
in Namibia. George Balandier has argued that in certain contexts,
religion may become "a smokescreen for politics". In Namibia,
millenarian assertions seem sometimes to approach a form of "psycho-
logical warfare".
During 1922-23 white fears of a general rising reached unpreceden-
ted heights. Reports of impending rebellions reached the administra-
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tion from nearly all districts. Settlers maintained that conditions
in 1922-23 were similar to those that preceded the rebellion of 1904
"when the former German Government made light of everything, even
answering with threats, until eventually the memorable days of January
1904, broke upon us". In February 1922 the magistrate of Keetmans-
hoop appealed to the administration to supply the town with 300
rifles. He maintained that he was "satisfied there is mischief brew-
ing - and if the Police were in a position to protect the public or
even the public in a position to protect themselves, I would have
delayed writing to you". In the latter half of the same year,
following the circulation of a letter calling for the unity of Ovam-
bos, Namas, Damaras, Hereros and San, the management of the OMEG coop-
er mine asked the administration for "at least two machine guns".
Although the colonial authorities went out of their way to squash
and discourage rumours or reports of impending rebellions, they were
at times also infected by the alarm and insecurity that pervaded the
country. The apparently panic-stricken response of the administration
to the Bondelswart Rebellion is only one example of the tenuousness of
the confident image the administration attempted to project. In
October 1922 Native Commissioner Manning was doubtful that a general
rising would occur but foresaw the possibility of small "outbreaks" in
isolated parts of the country after the rains set in.
As submitted in previous Memoranda, the question of settled
conditions in parts where no strong tribal control exists
largely depends upon a sufficient number of Police and out-
posts for regular patrols strong enough to carry out the law
and - in the absence of a small mobile force which seems
very desirable - rifle associations in every district ... I
would respectively venture the opinion that the means of en-
forcing all laws or promptly dealing with possible outbreaks
in this, large Territory are not adequate at the present
time.
During the same month the Secretary for South West Africa sent a
coded telegramme to the magistrate of Okahandja requesting him to em-
ploy spies to ascertain the extent to which blacks in the districts
were armed. It would be "bad policy" to open small stations and have
men and equipment captured, he advised. Forces should be concentra-
ted.
In a situation of this sort, the fine dividing line between the
intention to create fear and insecurity among whites and the more
active intention to encourage or bring about an actual rebellion is
blurred. That between 1922 and 1925 there were two large-scale
rebellions and a number of other smaller incidents of resistance and
defiance, is on its own an indication that rumours of a general rising
went beyond the mere attempt to frighten the settlers and the admini-
stration. The dilemma this posed for settlers and administration is
expressed by the Rhenish missionary A Kuhlmann:
If there was a question of an armed rising we would hardly
find it out, for as long as the people talk big, there is no
direct danger, but if the hidden spark of hostility contin-
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ues to smoulder on there is no saying when it may burst into
flames.
Indications of rebellion were apparent even before the Bondelswart
revolt erupted in May 1922. The Bondelswarts had come close to an
active rebellion in 1917, and thereafter there were frequent reports
of unrest in the district of Warmbad. More important, there were
indications that the Bondelswarts may have expected their rebellion to
develop into a general rising. According to a police informer, talk
of a general rising in the Herero stronghold of Okahandja had begun in
1921. In February 1922 the magistrate of Keetmanshoop appealed to
the administration for military assistance to meet what he termed his
"strong suspicion of native unrest in this town and District". Al-
though he was reproached by the Secretary for SWA for exaggerating the
situation, the magistrate refused to back down, asserting that there
was indeed a "restlessness among the Natives". To back up his claim,
the magistrate stated that only a few days before there had been a
"big meeting" in the Warmbad district (the district of the Bondel-
swarts) . "Even the Hottentots from this district were, notified to
X X o
attend and their masters were unable to hold them back."
In March 1922 the magistrate of Rehoboth also reported "unrest
amongst the Hottentots in this country". A Baster field cornet had
been told that the Namas were preparing for war. The Baster captai.i,
Cornelius van Wyk, told the magistrate that "since the New Year he had
noticed strange Hottentots in his area and that letters are passing
between Hottentots here and others outside the District". A patrol
sent out to investigate had found the suspected Namas in possession of
Garveyist propaganda. In his own account of the Bondelswart rebell-
ion , the administrator, Gysbert Hofmeyr, maintained that fear of a
general rebellion had prompted the administration into bombing this
small and poorly armed community into submission. He claimed that
after the outbreak of the revolt he received information which con-
vinced him "of the possibility if not probability, of the whole coun-
try going ablaze and the history of German times being repeated unless
a peaceful settlement was quickly announced ... or a decisive blow was
quickly struck". Further evidence to support this emerged after
the rebellion. The Keetmanshoop police reported in October 1922, for
example, that during the rebellion, Jan Hendriks, leader of the Veld-
skoendraers, had convened a meeting of Nama and Herero leaders in his
area "with the object of assisting the Bondelswarts". It was also re-
ported that another meeting had been held in the Berseba reserve where
the Isaacs faction and the younger people had decided to help the Bon-
delswarts. It was only through the intervention of the collaborative
Chief Goliath that they had been prevented from doing so. Accord-
ing to evidence presented to the Bondelswarts Commission, the Bondel-
swart leader, Jacobus Christian, wielded considerable influence not
only over his own people in the Warmbad area, but also over Namas at
Berseba and Keetmanshoop. Shortly before the military campaign
against the Bondelswarts, the Keetmanshoop Nama captain, Manasse,
wrote to Christian asking what could be done about the pass laws.
During the rebellion a Basuto who was employed by the municipality
as a foreman of the Keetmanshoop black township addressed a meeting
urging the people to attack the town and sieze arms and ammunition. In
July a police patrol which had been sent out to arrest Jan Hendriks,
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captain of the Veldskoendraers, and six others for failing to pay the
dog tax, was fired upon. Hendriks was later sentenced to six years
imprisonment for attempted murder.
In the same month the magistrate of Gobabis was killed by a poison-
ed arrow during a skirmish between the police and a large group of
San. The conflict with the San had begun in June 1922 when a police
patrol was sent from Gobabis to investigate stock thefts on an iso-
lated farm and was ambushed by a large group of San. In July the
Gobabis magistrate set out with an armed patrol to locate the San and
"negotiate" with them. At Epukiro the magistrate received information
to the effect that the San under Zameko were going to fight and that
they had collected large quantities of dried meat as provisions for
the kriegsleute (soldiers). "They say straight out that they are
going to make war." A missionary from Epukiro who had gone out to
investigate the theft of some stock was compelled to beat a hasty
retreat when he came under fire from the San. A few days later the
magistrate and his patrol located the San and in the ensuing battle
the magistrate was killed by a poisoned arrow. After this incident
the administration received information which connected the San revolt
with a more general rising of blacks in the territory. According to
one informant, two representatives of Samuel Maherero had entered the
territory from Bechuanaland, and had toured the country, in order to
discuss the strategy for a future rebellion. The tactics of 1904 had
been inadequate because the Hereros had first attacked the farms,
giving the whites in the towns the opportunity to mobilise. The
mobility of the Hereros had also been restricted by their large herds
of cattle. In preparation for the coming war, blacks should therefore
sell their cattle and buy horses and donkeys, and when the time came
they should attack the towns first. The messengers had also stated
that ±he Damaras and Bushmen (San) would also be involved in the
war. Although this report may have been fabricated by the farmers
of the district, who had long been agitating for police reinforce-
ments, other information that emerged during this period lends some
credibility to the report. For example, a missionary at Epukiro
reported in the same month that the San were going to make war. In
June 1922 the magistrate of Rehoboth reported that the Hereros were
buying horses on a "large scale". This and other information led him
to believe that the Hereros were preparing to rebel. In September
and October there were persistent reports linking a general rising to
the eastern frontier, and including the San among the rebels. For ex-
ample, one informant stated that Hereros, San and "American^ Negroes"
had gathered on the eastern frontier to prepare for a war. Another
referred to the killing of the Gobabis magistrate adding that
(t)hose were native people who did that., and all natives are
the same. We can easily get rifles ...
As the rainy season approached, talk of an impending rebellion
became more persistent. In Cmaruru, for example, a police informer
stated that
(t)he talk is that if there is any trouble here, they, the
Hereros, are to let Samuel Maherero know; they also state
that they can get guns and ammunition in a day. This talk
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is general in the location among Hereros including men and
women.
The informer went on to say that he had heard "a little while back"
that Herero emissaries had been sent from Windhoek into the area
occupied by the Bondelswarts.
The Hereros, the Rehoboth Bastards and the Bondelswarts are
on friendly terms. The Hereros say that the Bastards have
declined to give up their arms to the whites and that the
Hereros would stand by the Bastards in trouble.
Another informant from the same district stated that meetings had
taken place from the Okahandja district in the centre of the country
to the Grootfontein district in the far north. Whenever the Hereros
met on the farms, "their first and general conversation" was about the
rising.
However, the general rising which had been so widely anticipated in
1922-23, failed to materialise. The spirit of insurrection instead
spent itself in more limited acts of defiance and resistance which
only served to impress on the people the preponderant power of the
state. In various parts of the country blacks defied colonial regula-
tions relating to branding, sheep inspection and compulsory vaccina-
tion. In the Rehoboth district a group of Namas who had not been
allocated a reserve simply moved onto private farms with their stock,
and threatened to "kill any policeman who was sent to turn them
off". By 1924 the optimism and militancy of 1922-23 was already
giving way to resignation and passivity. At the beginning of 1924 the
administrator was able to report that "(n)o rumours of Herero or other
native risings have been circulated as has been the case in practical-
ly every preceding year". Acts of resistance still occurred, but
these were more sporadic and isolated.
None of the other organisations established in Namibia during this
period were able to match the influence and popular appeal of the
UNIA, and all failed to spread beyond the small, and relatively priv-
ileged, populations of the towns. The ICU, first launched in Luderitz
in December 1920, was from the start dominated by South African imm-
igrants, who, like the West Africans, formed a distinctive segment of
the Namibian population and received preferential treatment from the
authorities. In terms of an administration circular sent out to
municipal authorities in 1922, for example, it was pointed out that
"Cape Coloured persons and people of that class" did not fall under
the pass laws, the curfew regulations, and the municipal by-laws which
required blacks to keep off the side walks of certain Namibian towns.
With the exception of the prohibition against their obtaining liquor,
"these people are entitled to be placed on an equal footing with Euro-
peans in so far as the law is concerned". The circular also sugges-
ted that "wherever possible separate areas should be reserved for col-
oured persons at some distance from the ordinary locations". In
general a "liberal and progressive attitude" was advised in regard to
all blacks in urban areas. That these perceptions of differential
status were shared by the leaders of the ICU and UNIA in Luderitz is
made explicit in a report by the Native Commissioner for SWA on a
meeting with ICU and UNIA leaders in March 1922.
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It was noticed that although this deputation seemed concern-
ed about the welfare of visitors - presumably natives as a
rule - they said they thought their class should not have to
live in proximity to raw natives.
The ICU in Luderitz never got much beyond attempts to maintain the
organisation and the occasional articulation of grievances of the
privileged urban groups. As such, it did not represent a great threat
to the authorities, whose major anxiety was that it might- spread to
the contract labourers on the mines or to farm labourers. Measures
were therefore taken to isolate the ICU from labourers beyond the
townships, and office holders were warned to restrict their activities
to the "educated class". The organisation was also contained by
restricting the movement of organisers within the territory, and
isolating the two Namibian branches from headquarters in South Afri-
ca. Another major tactic of the administration was to encourage
splits in these organisations. Here it was clearly aided by the
suspicion that delevoped among local blacks of;the foreign origins
and privileged status of expatriate blacks in both the ICU and the
UNIA. The clearest example of this strategy was the formation of the
South West African National Congress (SWANC) in Luderitz in the latter
half of 1922.
The major catalyst for the establishment of the SWANC in Luderitz
was S M Bennett Ncwana, a rather strange figure who flits in and out
of black politics in the Cape and SWA. Ncwana visited Luderitz in
the latter half of 1922 in order to launch the organisation and held
the position of "chief organiser". According to the Luderitz Native
Affairs Department which had interrogated members of the new organi-
sation, the SWANC "was the outcome of dissatisfaction on the part of
SA and SWA natives with the IC Union (chiefly dominated by Capeboys)
and the UNIA Association (introduced and directed by West Indian and
West Coast natives) which is continually calling for funds for
American propaganda".
The local natives have apparently realised that they were
being made use of by the others and now wish to look after
their own interests. It is difficult to ascertain what
their aims in this direction w.exs except that they were
desirous of helping one another.
According to Ncwana, the major grievances of Namibian blacks were
the "unsympathetic administration, no outlet for discussing native
grievances, unreasonable taxation considering the absence of profit-
able work, and the absence of native educational facilities". Ncwana
was apparently also "emphatic in his professions of being desirous to
work in harmony with the authorities".
"I have been a moving spirit" he said, "in the native move-
ment , but never an agitator. I did adopt an aggressive
policy in my paper, but I found that it was not judicious. I
dropped the paper and tried to start afresh on the lines of
educating European opinion."
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Although the SWANC planned to adopt the constitution of the SANNC,
it was intended that the Namibian congress would be an entirely-
separate body and not a branch of the South African organisation.
The administration was not slow to realise the potential usefulness
of an organisation like the SWANC to its attempts to curb organised
black resistance in the territory. In a letter informing the admini-
stration in Windhoek of the formation of SWANC, the officer in charge
of Native Affairs in Luderitz clearly outlined the strategy which the
administration was to follow with considerable success.
In the absence of any law forbidding the formation of
native unions the most this department can possibly do to
minimize the danger which may arise from such unions is to
endeavour to split the membership into different factions -
as has been done here - but there is little doubt that
determined efforts will be made by one of the older bodies
to eventually bring them under the same banner again ...
It is probable that a purely native Congress can be
handled more easily than the UNIA or the ICU - especially
with a few Union natives, with an ingrained respect for the
white man's authority at the head of affairs - and, if the
Congress were taken under the wing of the Government, at its
formation, with some unobtrusive, but effectual, provisions
for Government supervision it might be a good policy.
These views were strongly endorsed by both the Secretary of the
Protectorate and the Native Commissioner. The latter observed that
"under official guidance this new association . . . might prove very
useful in upsetting dangerous, irresponsible foreign doctrines". He
added that the "combination of native races in SWA" had been "unknown
in former years" and that this was causing alarm among white residents
of the territory.
Although documentation of this period of the ICU in Namibia is at
best sketchy, it would appear that the Luderitz branch did not survive
the various problems it experienced in 1923-24. As for the Keetmans-
hoop branch, there is no evidence that it existed in anything but
name. UNIA experienced similar difficulties. The Native Affairs
Department reported in September 1923 that local blacks had withdrawn
from the UNIA branch in Windhoek and that no meetings had been held
"for some time". The conviction of Marcus Garvey in New York on a
charge of fraud may have contributed to the decline of the associa-
tion, it was suggested. The Luderitz branch was experiencing
similar difficulties, and in 1924 the administrator reported that the
Luderitz branches of both UNIA and ICU had "practically died out and
it is only the South-West Africa National Congress which still has
some adherents and occasionally holds meetings". It is not known
how long the SWANC survived, but it appears to have made no signif-
icant contribution, and is unlikely to have lasted beyond 1925.
The defiance and militancy which reached a peak in the 1922-23
period may have died down completely if it had not been for the Reho-
both rebellion of 1925. Although this rebellion revolved around the
essentially "internal" issue of local autonomy for the Baster commu-
nity at Rehoboth, it once again helped to provide a focus for the more
generalised and dispersed resistance of other communities - and in
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(articular for the Hereros. It further involved issues which tran-
scended the interests and concerns of the immediate community. As
a semi-autonomous community, the Rehoboth Gebiet represented the last
refuge for black stock-owners from the labour extractive system that
was taking shape in Namibia during the early 1920s. Because the
Rehoboth community was itself undergoing a process of impoverishment,
the renting of pasturage to black stock-owners provided an important
source of income to the Basters. Proclamation 11 of 1922, which
made squatting illegal, was not applied to Rehoboth, and it was not
until the Baster Agreement of 1923 that the authorities obtained the
legal means to control squatting within the Gebiet. However, the
resistance of Baster rebels who opposed the agreement prevented the
administration from taking action against squatters, and it was only
after the suppression of the Rehoboth rebellion in 1925 that African
tenants of the Basters were prosecuted within the Gebiet. The magis-
trate of Rehoboth pointed out after the rebellion that the prosecu-
tions of squatters
which was hardly possible under the old system of control by
the Raad, has certainly had the effect of stimulating the
labour supply and driving out loafers as well as preventing
the Gebied from becoming a refuge for deserters.
It was clearly in the interests of black squatters in Rehoboth to
exert every available influence towards retaining or extending Baster
autonomy. In terms of size of population and stock-ownership alone,
the Africans in Rehoboth formed a significant group. In 1925 the
ppulation of the Gebiet numbered 3,500 Basters, 2,500 Africans and
about thirty whites. Between 1925 and 1928, 230 Herero families were
removed from Rehoboth, taking with them 8,000 head of large stock and
25,000 head of small stock.
For the Hereros outside Rehoboth, the Basters rebels also offered
potential allies against the colonial regime - particularly as the
Rehoboth Burghers had retained most of their arms. Already in 1922
there were reports that the Herero leaders in Windhoek had established
contact with the Basters.
The Hereros say that the Bastards have declined to give up
their arms to the whites and that the Hereros should stand
by the Bastards in trouble.
These shared interests between Hereros and Basters became particularly
important during the Rehoboth rebellion because the rebellion coinci-
ded with the administration's attempts to remove the Hereros from the
"temporary" reserves in the central districts of the territory to the
newly established reserves in the Sandveld. The Herero leaders had
strongly resisted the move, arguing, with some justification, that the
allocated area could support neither them nor their stock, that it was
"a country only good for wild beasts".
By all accounts Africans, and particularly the Hereros, in the
Gebiet responded enthusiastically to the cause of the Baster rebels.
It is significant, for example, that more non-Basters than Basters
were arrested, and finally prosecuted, during the culmination of the
rebellion. Of the 632 people so arrested, 289 were Basters, 218 Herer-
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os, seventy five Namas and fifty Damaras. In his annual report,
the administrator expressed concern about the role of non-Basters in
the rebellion.
The most serious aspect of the attitude of the opposition in
Rehoboth, not only in this instance, but during the past
eighteen months, has been the effect on the natives who have
apparently come to regard the Gebiet as a sort of haven
where no law exits . . . the attitude of natives incited by
the opposition section was openly hostile ... It follows
that the,-natives do not wish to see our laws enforced in the
1 hi
Gebiet.
The Rehoboth magistrate reported that he had received information
to the effect that the Hereros were in favour of attacking the police
several days before the South African forces moved into Rehoboth.
Some months before the Rehoboth rebellion reached a head, the admini-
stration feared that a general rebellion might break out in the terri-
tory. In December 1925 the Administrator's Office sent an urgent com-
munique to all magistrates in the territory warning them that "the
administration has received reports of native unrest which has been
accentuated by the attitude of the Rehoboth Community as a result of
Proclamation No. 31 of 1924". It was believed that "native emissaries"
had been sent from one district to another and that "secret communica-
tions" were being exchanged. While the administration cautioned
against alarm, the magistrates were instructed to keep a close watch
on all "native movements" and to submit a weekly report on develop-
ments in each district. The magistrates were also urged to establish
"intelligence systems" to facilitate the removal of whites from iso-
lated rural areas should a rising occur.
Towards the end of March 1925 the head of the military forces in
the territory urged the Union Government to proclaim martial law in
the Rehoboth district, arguing that if resistance in the Gebiet was
"not immediately checked by extreme and drastic measures, conflagra-
tion may rapidly spread over the whole country and place us in posi-
tion to face a serious situation which under present adverse condi-
tions will be difficult to cope with". A few days after the sup-
pression of the rebellion, reports continued to reach the administra-
tion of a possible rising of the Hereros. The magistrate reported on
7 April that he had received information that the Hereros intended to
rise- He had been unable to ascertain the date of this rising, but
"gathered that it would be in about three weeks time."
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the administration's fear of a
general uprising were the measures adopted by the military in other
[arts of the territory after the suppression of the Rehoboth rebell-
ion. Herero witnesses maintained that the aircraft used to intimidate
Rehoboth rebels, not only flew over Rehoboth but also over the Herero
reserves of Orumba. Following the suppression of the Rehoboth ris-
ing, the administration pressed the Union government to sanction
"bombing demonstrations" in selected areas throughout the territory
including Ovamboland. The proposal was at first vetoed by the Minis-
ter of Defence, probably because of the international outcry that
followed the bombing of the Bondelswarts in 1922. The administrator
continued to insist on the importance of these "demonstrations" and
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permission was finally granted. The aim of these "bombing demon-
strations" was to impress upon potential rebels the great power of the
state, and thus avert a possible general rising. The "bombing demon-
strations" were used, for example, to impress upon leaders of the
Orumba "temporary reserve", the consequences of continuing to resist
the move to their new reserve in the Kalahari sandveld. They also
appear to have served their purpose in other areas. The magistrate of
Keetmanshoop, for example, reported that he had taken "advantage of
the presence of the Hereros in Tses Reserve at Kl. Vaalgras on the
occasion of the Bombing demonstration, to address them on the question
of branding and am glad to S M , that they all without exception are
having their cattle branded."
CONCLUSION
Essentially there were three major sets of factors which accounted
for the failure of this first phase of popular resistance in Namibia:
the fragmented nature of the Namibian social formation, the composi-
tion and nature of political organisations established during this
period, and the preponderant power of the colonial state.
Largely on account of ecological conditions, Namibia has a rela-
tively small population scattered over an area which is two-thirds
that of South Africa. The vast distances and scattered population
have provided a major obstacle to national organisation throughout
Namibian history. However, in the early 1920s the Namibian population
was still in the process of recovering from the shattering impact of
the colonial wars and repression of indigenous institutions of the
early twentieth century. Although they were largely dispossessed, the
people of the Police Zone lacked the social integration to constitute
a proletariat. The larger part of the population was scattered among
the various farms and in small and badly organised rural communities.
The urban population was small even in relation to the total popula-
tion, and tightly controlled by the colonial state. A foreign compo-
nent of the black population, with distinct interests of its own,
played a dominant role in the urban areas and added further diversity
(and disunity) to the Namibian social formation.
The division of the territory into the Police Zone and northern
area placed additional obstacles in the way of national organisation,
and effectively excluded the more densely populated northern areas
from the political movement that developed in the Police Zone. Sim-
ilarly, migrant workers from the northern areas were effectively iso-
lated from the rest of the population by the contract labour and com-
pound systems. However, despite the isolation of the north and co-
option of tribal leaders into a system of indirect rule, there are
indications that some of the Ovambos were also influenced by the
spirit of rebellion that permeated the southern and central regions.
During the period of intense resistance towards the end of 1922 and
the beginning of 1923, Ipumbu, king of the Ukuambi Ovambos, issued
ammunition to his people and ordered them to guard the Onolongo and
Ondangua routes into his country in order to prevent whites from
entering or passing through his territory. There were also reports
that the Ukuambi were selling stock to obtain ammunition and gun
powder. In December 1922 an Ukuambi headman who had quarrelled with
Ipumbu informed the administration that the Ukuambi king had been
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sending agents into the Police Zone in order to acquire both arms and
information.
They (Ipumbu's agents) invariably go without passes and are
clever in evading the police. They are all after buying
rifles and ammunition. He does not send a few at a time,
twenty to thirty are always away south. They bring him
stupid information such as "this Government is finished, we
hear all
 19-y1er that the Americans are coming to take this
country.
Early in 1923 the Portuguese representative at Namakunde on the
border with Angola stated that he had received reports "that natives
in Damaraland were making preparations with Ovambos and natives in our
territory to rise against our and your Governments". Earlier there
had been a rumour in the 9 H 5 J O district that the Hereros were obtain-
ing arms from Ovamboland.
In spite of these and other, earlier-mentioned signs of co-opera-
tion, the anti-colonial movement in the territory never achieved the
degree of coordination necessary to pose a serious threat to the colo-
nial state. On each occasion the authorities were able to isolate and
deal swiftly with manifestations of resistance, thus preventing
further outbreaks elsewhere in the territory.
The structures in Namibian political organisations during this
period were also unsuited to the task of leading effective and unified
resistance to the colonial state. Both the UNIA and ICU were
externally-based organisations, and this allowed the authorities to
isolate the Namibian branches from their headquarters in Cape Town and
New York. Furthermore, the millenarian content of Garveyism tended to
deflect Namibian resistance away from internal organisation towards a
hopeless dream of external intervention. Most damaging, however, was
the class basis of the leaders of both organisations. Garvey's organ-
isation essentially represented the interests of the Negro petty bour-
geoisie, and it was therefore to be expected that his economic nation-
alism would attract members of a similar class in Namibia. Comparable
difficulties were associated with the leadership of the ICU. Like
their counterparts in South Africa and the United States, the Luderitz
leaders of UNIA and the ICU occupied a relatively privileged, if
somewhat marginal (and therefore ambivalent), position within the
Namibian social formation. That these leaders were also predominantly
foreign made their privileged position in the community particularly
visible and helped to generate resentment among the local population.
Even more important, where this embryonic class secured control over
one of the organisations, it ensured that its own interests would be
given precedence. Finally, internal cleavages within both organisa-
tions provided the administration with an ideal opportunity to drive a
wedge between their different factions.
In the final analysis, however, it was the disproportionate mili-
tary and organisational resources of the state that brought about the
abandonment of this phase of resistance in Namibia. In particular the
aeroplane changed the whole complexion of guerrilla warfare in the
territory and provided a powerful symbol of colonial supremacy with
which to intimidate the colonised. Aircraft had been used not only to
effect the swift suppression of the Bondelswart rebellion and to in-
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timidate the Rehoboth rebels, but also to impress upon other indige-
nous communities the military power of the colonial state. While
military technology may under most circumstances, _be less important
than political and ideological means of control, the analysis in
the first part of this pap.er suggested that between 1915 and 1925 the
colonial state was still in the process of consolidating its hold over
the indigenous communities of Namibia. It was only after 1925, with
the establishment of reserves, the co-option of indigenous and urban
elites, and the further elaboration of the legal superstructure, that
the colonial state was able to exercise effective control over the
colonised population. Given the circumstances of the early 1920s, the
colonial state was forced to rely more heavily on its "instruments of
violence". The introduction of aircraft was therefore crucial in pre-
venting localised outbreaks of rebellion from spreading to other parts
of the territory. It may be argued that although the circumstances
and consciousness of most of the black population favoured a general
rising, it lacked the organisational structures necessary to plan and
coordinate such a rising. This meant that a general rising would only
be possible if a specific community took the initiative in leading the
rebellion and was able to hold out long enough for other communities
to join it in the struggle. The administration clearly realised this,
and therefore acted swiftly and brutally to suppress both the Bondel-
swart and Rehoboth rebellions.
Without the resources to challenge the enormous power of the colo-
nial state, overt resistance ceased to be a practical or rational al-
ternative, and the colonised could do little but wait for some de-
velopment to change the balance of power in their favour. For the
next twenty years of Namibian history, resistance in the police zone
took largely covert and symbolic forms.
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